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 Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) on transparency for investors by measuring the increase in 
earnings management during the post-adoption period of IFRS. One sign of earnings 
management is current year earnings being only slightly higher than the previous year’s 
earnings. An increase in earnings management means a decrease in accounting quality 
and a decrease of transparency for investors. By comparing firms that mandatorily 
adopted IFRS to similar benchmark firms in terms of strength of legal enforcement, 
book-to-market ratios, market values and net incomes, I am able to run empirical 
regressions examining variables of growth, equity issuance, leverage, debt issuance, 
turnover, size, cash flow, and time period in order to determine the effect of the adoption 
on IFRS on earnings growth. After looking at 516 firms from 20 countries for the years 
of 2002-2007, I conclude that IFRS is decreasing financial reporting quality and 
decreasing transparency for the investing public, and therefore is not accomplishing its 
goal of bringing efficiency, accountability, and transparency to global financial markets. 
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I. Introduction 
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) were developed to 
attempt to create a single set of high quality global accounting standards. In order to test 
whether IFRS actually achieves this goal of high quality standards, one may explore the 
change in earnings management for firms that adopted IFRS. Earnings management can 
be described as management taking advantage of accounting techniques and using them 
to portray an overly positive financial position (“Earnings Management”). If there is an 
increase in earnings management, there is a decrease in financial reporting quality. Using 
sustaining the previous year’s income as a threshold for earnings management, this study 
explores whether the adoption of IFRS increases or decreases earnings management.  By 
matching firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS to benchmark firms by comparing 
strength of legal enforcement, book-to-market ratios, market values and net incomes, I 
am able to run empirical regressions using variables of growth, equity issuance, leverage, 
debt issuance, turnover, size, cash flow, time, and IFRS in order to determine the effect of 
the adoption of IFRS on earnings management. Surprisingly, the results show that when 
countries mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005, earnings management increased and 
accounting quality decreased. I come to the conclusion that the adoption of IFRS 
decreases transparency for investors due to an increase in earnings management.  
In 2001 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) replaced the 
International Accounting Standards Committee with the intention of better serving the 
public interest.  Since the establishment, the IASB has continuously developed the 
International Financial Reporting Standards and as of 2018, approximately 120 countries 
have adopted these standards (“IFRS FAQs.”). However, some powerful and influential 
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countries such as the United States and China still use a set of their own domestic 
accounting standards. For the United States, this is the U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
 The United States, which has the largest capital market in the world, is reluctant 
to adopt IFRS. On the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s strategic plan for 
2014-2018, the SEC stated that it will “continue to promote the establishment of high-
quality accounting standards in order to meet the needs of investors. Due to the 
increasingly global nature of capital markets, the agency will work to promote higher 
quality financial reporting worldwide and will consider, among other things, whether a 
single set of high-quality global accounting standards is achievable” (Bogopolsky 2015). 
Although this plan hinted towards the U.S. adopting a set of global standards such as 
IFRS, as we reach the end of 2018, it does not seem likely that the U.S. will be adopting 
IFRS in the near future.  
The U.S. and all countries that use IFRS have the same objective, “to develop a 
set of standards that will bring transparency, accountability and efficiency to financial 
markets around the world” (“IFRS-Home”). In order to know if IFRS is truly beneficial 
for financial reporting quality we must first understand the differences between IFRS and 
other accounting standards such as U.S. GAAP. The main differences between U.S. 
GAAP and IFRS are listed in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Main Differences between U.S. GAAP and IFRS 
Topic U.S. GAAP IFRS 
Classification of 
Liabilities 
Current liabilities are 
expected to be settled within 
12 months and noncurrent 
liabilities are expected to be 
settled after 12 months. 
There is no differentiation 
between classifications of 
liabilities (all debts are 
considered noncurrent). 
Consolidation Prefers a risks-and-rewards 
model. 
Favors a control model. 
Development costs  Development costs are 
considered expenses. 
Development costs can be 
capitalized if certain 
criteria are met.  
Earnings-per-Share The computation of EPS 
averages the individual 
interim period incremental 
shares.  
The earning-per-share 
calculation does not 
average the individual 
interim period 
calculations.  
Fixed Assets Fixed assets must be valued 
using the cost model (take 
into account historical value 
minus accumulated 
depreciation). 
The revaluation model 
(fair value at the current 
date minus accumulated 
depreciation and 
impairment losses) is used 
for fixed assets. 
Intangibles Intangibles are recognized 
at fair value. 
Intangibles are recognized 
if the asset will have a 
future economic benefit 
and has a certain measure 
of reliability.  
Inventory Companies have the choice 
between LIFO and FIFO. 
LIFO cannot be used. 
Quality Characteristics  Works within a hierarchy of 
characteristics like 
relevance, reliability, 
comparability, and 
understandability to make 
informed decisions based on 
user-specific circumstances. 
Works within the same 
characteristics as GAAP 
with the exception that 
decisions can not be made 
on the specific 
circumstances of an 
individual. 
Statement of Income Extraordinary items are 
shown separately under the 
net income.  
Extraordinary items are 
not segregated and are 
included in the income 
statement.  
(Forgeas 2008); (“IFRS and GAAP Accounting: Top 10 Differences & Effects on Business”) 
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The United States may want to consider adopting IFRS in order to have a single 
set of globally-accepted accounting standards. This will allow for easier investing for 
non-U.S. stakeholders in U.S. firms and easier investing for U.S. investors in non-U.S. 
firms. Non-U.S. stakeholders sometimes require audited financial statements and budget 
and management information prepared under IFRS from U.S. firms. If U.S. firms had the 
same accounting standards as most other countries, it would be easier for all stakeholders 
to make investment decisions and would improve efficiency in markets.  
 If IFRS truly increases financial reporting quality, then the US, among other 
countries, should adopt this set of accounting standards. Increasing accounting quality 
leads to more transparency between firms and investors, leading to better investment 
decision-making.  
Since it is generally accepted that an improvement of accounting quality is 
defined as a feature that reduces earnings management, it is necessary to assess IFRS 
effect on earnings management. One proxy for earnings management is sustaining the 
previous year’s income. If the current year’s income is only slightly above the previous 
year’s earnings, then the manager could have managed earnings to present an overly 
positive view of the firm’s financial position. This could possibly alter investment 
decisions and mislead investors. To truly know whether IFRS is increasing quality of 
financial statements, it is necessary to determine the effect IFRS has had on year over 
year income. 
 The next section analyses current literature and discusses the gap in the literature 
that needs to be filled. Next will be the explanation of the data and the methodology used 
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to run the empirical regressions. Once the results are obtained, the findings and its 
implications on investors will be discussed.  
II. Literature  
 
120 countries have adopted IFRS as their own domestic financial reporting 
standards. Since IFRS spans much of the world, and there are so many stakeholders that 
are affected by the standards, many researchers are interested in the financial effects that 
IFRS have on firms and their stakeholders. The stakeholders, including all financial 
statement users, should have the confidence that the IASB is providing the best standards 
that truly benefit the public. In order to do so, IASB hopes to continuously increase 
financial reporting quality.  
Through empirical study, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1998) find that there 
are three thresholds for earnings management. These include sustaining recent 
performance, positive profits, and meeting the market’s expectations. Brown and Caylor 
(2005) also find these to be the main thresholds of earnings management and find 
meeting the market’s expectations to be at the top of the threshold hierarchy in the early 
2000’s. The current literature discussing the effect of IFRS on accounting quality has 
mainly focused on positive profits and meeting the market’s expectations, therefore 
leaving a knowledge gap in the literature when it comes to the effect of IFRS on the 
threshold of firms sustaining recent performance.   
Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) investigate 327 firms between 1994 and 2003. 
The study suggests IFRS can lead to improvements in accounting quality by removing 
some accounting options that managers can use to manipulate earnings. This reduces 
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managerial discretion and therefore can reduce earnings management and improve 
financial reporting quality. To account for earnings management, the study uses three 
metrics for income smoothing (variability of the change in net income scaled by total 
assets, ratio of the variability of the change in net income to the variability of the change 
in operating cash flows, and correlation between accruals and cash flows) and one metric 
for managing earnings towards a target (positive or negative net income).  Barth, 
Landsman, and Lang (2008) conclude that the adoption of international standards 
decreases earnings management and therefore increases accounting quality.  
Horton (2013) confirms Barth, Landsman, and Lang’s findings by also examining 
the effect of IFRS on earnings management. Horton however uses the threshold of 
meeting analyst benchmarks. Horton discovers that there is an improvement in analyst 
forecast accuracy after the adoption of the international reporting standards. If there is an 
increase in analyst forecast accuracy, there is also an increase in transparency for 
financial investors and therefore an increase in accounting quality. 
Ahmed, Neel, and Wang (2012b) looked at the preliminary effects of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS on accounting quality and found contrasting results to both Horton 
(2013) and Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008). Examining a wide set of firms from 20 
countries that adopted IFRS in 2005 and matching them to firms that did not adopt IFRS, 
they focus on finding the effect on income smoothing, reporting aggressiveness, and 
earnings management. The study looks at earnings management by focusing on two 
thresholds, positive earnings and beating analyst forecasts benchmarks, the same two 
thresholds that Horton (2013) and Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) analyze. Although 
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Ahmed, Neel, and Wang hypothesize that accounting quality does not change after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, the research concludes IFRS adoption results in a decline in 
accounting quality. Although their research finds no change in meeting earnings targets 
for IFRS firms, there is evidence of accrual aggressiveness, income smoothing, and 
decrease in timeliness of loss recognition. Ahmed concludes that IFRS decreases 
accounting quality.   
Ahmed, Chalmers, and Khlif (2013a) also provide a meta-analysis of IFRS 
adoption effects. They investigate financial reporting effects, specifically looking at 
quality of analysts’ earnings forecasts. By meta-analyzing 14 studies, they confirm their 
hypothesis and Horton’s findings that analysts forecast accuracy has increased 
significantly since the adoption of IFRS, allowing for more transparency.  
Some of the studies mentioned above use data from companies that voluntarily 
adopted IFRS and some of the studies use data from companies that mandatorily adopted 
IFRS. In Ahmed, Neel, and Wang’s preliminary evidence, only mandatory adoptions are 
used in the regressions while Barth (2008) consider voluntary adopters also. Ahmed, 
Neel, and Wang argue that Barth’s findings cannot be generalized to mandatory adopters 
since voluntary adopters have a stronger incentive to report higher quality financials since 
they chose to adopt IFRS. Besides Ahmed, Neel and Wang’s study, the only other 
relevant research that looks at mandatory adoption is from Chen (2010). Chen researches 
discretionary accruals of 15 firms between 2000 and 2007 and finds that after the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, the discretionary accruals decrease significantly. This 
means that after IFRS adoption, there is less earnings management towards a target, 
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which means there is higher quality of financial reporting after IFRS. This contradicts 
Ahmed, Neel and Wang’s findings that IFRS actually reduces the quality of financial 
reporting. More research needs to be completed before one could be able to draw a 
sufficient conclusion.  
Several studies, as mentioned, explore the mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
meeting analysts’ expectations and reporting positive income, but there has been no 
research specifically looking at sustaining the previous year’s earnings. This motivates us 
to research the effect of IFRS on this threshold. If a firm reports a year’s earnings that are 
slightly more positive than last year’s earnings, it is likely that there is earnings 
management occurring and therefore financial reporting quality is declining.  
This paper will research the effect of the adoption of IFRS on earnings 
management by looking at year over year earnings scaled by total assets. Since there is 
limited research on mandatory adoption of IFRS on earnings management, this paper will 
look exclusively at mandatory adoption of IFRS instead of voluntary adoption of IFRS. 
This paper will provide further empirical analysis on the benefits of IFRS as an 
international standard. By researching the effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on 
sustaining previous year’s earnings, I fill a gap in the current literature.  
III. Data 
 
This study uses data of earnings growth to further explore the effect of IFRS on 
earnings management. To explore sustaining previous year’s income as an earnings 
benchmark, firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS will be matched and compared to 
14 
benchmark firms that did not adopt IFRS. The firms will first be matched based on their 
strength of legal enforcement.  
Ali and Hwang (1999) found that countries with stricter legal enforcement tend to 
have higher quality accounting. Other researchers have confirmed this such as 
Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz’s study (2006). For the strength of legal enforcement, a value 
of 0 for weak legal enforcement countries and a value of 1 for strong enforcement 
countries have been assigned to each country. This study uses Ahmed’s values for each 
country’s strength of legal enforcement. Ahmed uses the rule of law variable for the year 
2005 to assign the values. The rule of law variable captures “perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al. 2007). If Ahmed found that a country 
scored above a 1.30 then the country is considered to have strong legal enforcement, and 
if the country scored below a 1.30 then the country was considered to have weak legal 
enforcement. Table 2 shows the legal enforcement scores of the countries in the data set 
after removing firms with missing data. 
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Table 2: Legal Enforcement Values  
Country Rule of Law Score Legal Enforcement 
Where 1= Strong 
IFRS  
Australia 1.7 1 
Austria 1.8 1 
Belgium 1.4 1 
Denmark 1.9 1 
Finland 1.9 1 
France 1.3 1 
Germany  1.7 1 
Greece 0.7 0 
Hong Kong 1.5 1 
Italy 0.5 0 
Ireland 1.6 1 
Netherlands 1.7 1 
Norway 1.9 1 
Philippines -0.4 0 
Portugal  1.1 0 
Spain 1.1 0 
South Africa 0.2 0 
Sweden 1.8 1 
Switzerland 2.0 1 
United Kingdom 1.6 1 
Benchmark 
Argentina -0.55 0 
Brazil  -0.5 0 
Canada 1.8 1 
Chile 1.2 0 
India 0.1 0 
Israel 0.7 0 
Japan 1.4 1 
Korea Rep. 0.8 0 
Malaysia 0.6 0 
Mexico -0.5 0 
New Zealand 1.9 1 
Pakistan -0.9 0 
Taiwan 0.9 0 
Thailand 0.1 0 
United States  1.5 1 
(Ahmed et. al. 2012b) 
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 Once matched on legal enforcement strength, the firms will then be matched 
based on size, performance, and book-to-market. The equation is shown below where 
MV=Market Value, BTM=Book-to-market, and NI=Net Income. Subscript “I” refers to 
IFRS firms and subscript “B” refers to benchmark firms.   
(
𝑀𝑉𝐼−𝑀𝑉𝐵
𝑀𝑉𝐼
)
2
+ (
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐼−𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐵
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝐼
)
2
+ (
𝑁𝐼𝐼−𝑁𝐼𝐵
𝑁𝐼𝐼
)
2
 
The firms will be matched by which benchmark firm minimizes equation (1) for 
each IFRS firm. Once an IFRS firm and a benchmark firm are matched, they are unable 
to be matched to any other firms (matched without replacement). This basis of matching 
which allows us to control for differences in market value of equity, book value of equity, 
and net income, comes from Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu (2009) and is also used by 
Ahmed Neel and Wang (2012b).  
After matching the firms and deleting any firms that were left unmatched, 
empirical regressions on earnings growth will be run. By looking at the growth of current 
year’s earnings, and determining whether that earnings increase is less than 0.5%, 1%, 
and 1.5% of total assets, it is possible to see if earnings management has occurred. Three 
percentages are used because there is not a universal threshold and it is preferable to test 
the data at three levels of significance and see if each percentage will give a similar 
result. Of each of the three equations below, I will run an ordinary least squares 
regression and a probit model regression. The ordinary least squares regression finds the 
betas of variables on a linear function by minimizing the sum of the squares of the 
difference of the observed dependent variable and the predicted dependent variable given 
by the function. The probit model is a type of regression that only allows the dependent 
(1) 
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variable to take two values. In this case the value of earnings increase can either be less 
than the specified percentage of total assets or more than the specified percentage of total 
assets. The variables are defined on the next page in table 3.  
 
𝐻𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +
𝛽5𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 +   𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐹 + 𝜀 
 
𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ +
𝛽5𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 +   𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +
𝛽10𝐶𝐹 + 𝜀 
 
𝑂𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐻𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑓𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆 +
𝛽4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 +   𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 +
𝛽8𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽10𝐶𝐹 + 𝜀 
 
 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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Where: 
Table 3: Variables  
 
The data comes from a widely known database dedicated to financial, statistical, 
and market information on global companies, Compustat Global. After the data is 
compiled and the firms are matched, I am able to conduct the regression analysis.  
After removing firms that did not have all sales, common stock, liabilities, assets, 
net cash flow from operating activities, book-to-market ratio, market value, net income, 
accounting standard, and date data for the years 2002-2007, and matching the IFRS firms 
to similar benchmark firms using equation (1) above, there are 516 firms from 20 
Variables 
IFRS= {
𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝐚 𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲 𝐈𝐅𝐑𝐒 𝐚𝐝𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐞𝐫
𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝐟𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐛𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐡𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤 𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐦 
} 
 
Lev=
End of Year Total Liabilities
End of Year Average Total Assets
 
 
Post= {
𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝐢𝐧 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔 − 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕
𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝐧𝐨𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟔 − 𝟐𝟎𝟎𝟕 
} 
 
Dissue=%∆ in Total Liabilities 
 
PostIFRS= Post*IFRS 
 
Turn=
Sales
End of Year Total Assets
 
 
Growth= %∆ 𝐢𝐧 𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬 
 
Size=  Natural Logarithm of Average Total       
Assets 
 
Eissue= %∆ 𝐢𝐧 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐭𝐨𝐜𝐤 
 
CF=
Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities
Average Total Assets
 
 
Halfofassets= 
{
𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝐄𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡 < 𝟎. 𝟓% 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 
𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝐄𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡 > 𝟎. 𝟓% 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 
} 
OneofAsset=
{
0 if Earnings Growth < 1% of Total Assets 
1 if Earnings Growth > 1% of Total Assets 
} 
OneandHalfofAsset==
{
𝟎 𝐢𝐟 𝐄𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡 < 𝟏. 𝟓% 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 
𝟏 𝐢𝐟 𝐄𝐚𝐫𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠𝐬 𝐆𝐫𝐨𝐰𝐭𝐡 > 𝟏. 𝟓% 𝐨𝐟 𝐓𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐀𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 
} 
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countries that are left to run the regression. Most countries adopted IFRS in 2005 and 
therefore by using years 2002-2007 I can examine the pre and post adoption periods.  
To deal with outliers, on each tail, 5% of the observations were modified. 
Summary statistics for the variables can be found in Table 4 below and the univariate 
correlation between the variables can be found in Table 5. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
IFRS 0.50 0.50 0 1 1 
Post 0.33 0.47 0 0 1 
Post IFRS 0.17 0.42 0 0 1 
Growth 0.07 0.17 -0.02 0.05 0.14 
Eissue 0.03 0.09 0 0 0.01 
Lev 0.56 0.19 0.43 0.56 0.69 
Dissue 0.07 0.24 -0.08 0.02 0.15 
Turn 0.96 0.55 0.55 0.86 1.26 
Size 8.05 2.30 6.48 8.04 9.64 
CF 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.13 
 
Table 5: Univariate Correlation Between Variables 
 IFRS Post 
Post- 
IFRS 
 
  
 Turn Size CF 
IFRS 1.00          
Post 0.06 1.00         
PostIFRS 0.32 0.83 1.00        
Growth -0.14 0.10 0.05 1.00       
Eissue -0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.18 1.00      
Lev 0.21 -0.02 0.07 -0.11 -0.03 1.00     
Dissue -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.40 0.20 -0.05 1.00    
Turn 0.18 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 0.27 -0.09 1.00   
Size   -0.14 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 -0.02 -0.17 1.00  
CF 0.16 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.03 0.14 0.17 1.00 
 
Growth 
 
Eissue Dissue Lev 
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The correlation table shows that there are no variables that are highly correlated 
except for the variables that are expected to be highly correlated such as IFRS and 
PostIFRS with a correlation of 0.32, and Post and PostIFRS with a correlation of 0.83. 
These are expected to be highly correlated because PostIFRS is simply the product of 
Post and IFRS.  
I hypothesize that the variable PostIFRS will have a positive coefficient with a 
significant p-value because previous studies have found that the adoption of IFRS 
increases financial reporting quality. I predict that transparency for investors will 
increase.  
IV. Results 
Below are the results for the OLS and probit model regressions on equations (2), 
(3), and (4) that were defined previously. In the following regression results, examining 
the PostIFRS variable will show the effect of IFRS on firms post adoption. The cluster-
robust standard error is used to account for the within-cluster correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. The p-value shows the probability that one sees a result as extreme as 
the one obtained by chance. We will use the p-value to look for significant variables at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  
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Table 6: Probit and OLS Regression Results with Earnings Increase Criteria 
Variable Coefficient 
Cluster-Robust 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
Probit with 1.5% Criteria 
IFRS 0.08 0.08 0.32 
Post* 0.19 0.12 0.10 
PostIFRS* -0.20 0.13 0.10 
Growth -1.31 0.20 0.14 
Eissue -0.09 0.31 0.76 
Lev 0.10 0.15 0.51 
Dissue** 0.59 0.14 0.02 
Turn 0.05 0.05 0.30 
Size 0.05 0.01 0.11 
CF* -1.73 0.43 0.06 
Constant -0.14 0.14 0.30 
OLS with 1.5% Criteria  
IFRS 0.03 0.03 0.32 
Post* 0.07 0.04 0.09 
PostIFRS* -0.08 0.05 0.10 
Growth** -0.49 0.07 0.02 
Eissue -0.04 0.12 0.71 
Lev 0.04 0.06 0.46 
Dissue*** 0.22 0.05 0.01 
Turn 0.02 0.02 0.28 
Size 0.02 0.01 0.58 
CF** -0.65 0.16 0.04 
Constant*** 0.45 0.05 0.01 
Probit with 1% Criteria 
IFRS 0.07 0.08 0.42 
Post** 0.22 0.11 0.05 
PostIFRS** -0.25 0.13 0.05 
Growth -1.40 0.20 0.19 
Eissue -0.25 0.31 0.42 
Lev 0.16 0.14 0.26 
Dissue 0.53 0.13 0.12 
Turn* -0.01 0.05 0.10 
Size** 0.02 0.01 0.07 
CF** -1.96 0.40 0.03 
Constant -0.07 0.15 0.63 
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Table 6: Continued  
Variable Coefficient 
Cluster-Robust 
Standard Error 
P-Value 
OLS with 1% Criteria 
IFRS 0.03 0.03 0.40 
Post** 0.09 0.04 0.04 
PostIFRS** -0.09 0.05 0.05 
Growth -0.54 0.07 0.14 
Eissue -0.10 0.12 0.40 
Lev 0.07 0.05 0.23 
Dissue*** 0.20 0.05 0.01 
Turn 0.01 0.02 0.91 
Size** 0.01 0.01 0.04 
CF** -0.75 0.16 0.03 
Constant*** 0.47 0.06 0.01 
Probit with 0.5% Criteria 
IFRS 0.07 .08 0.41 
Post** 0.22 0.11 0.05 
PostIFRS** -0.25 0.13 0.05 
Growth -1.40 0.20 0.11 
Eissue -0.26 0.31 0.42 
Lev 0.16 0.14 0.26 
Dissue 0.53 0.13 0.31 
Turn 0.01 0.04 0.92 
Size** 0.02 0.01 0.04 
CF** -1.96 0.41 0.05 
Constant -0.07 0.15 0.63 
OLS with 0.5% Criteria 
IFRS 0.02 0.03 0.46 
Post 0.07 0.04 0.11 
PostIFRS** -0.10 0.05 0.05 
Growth -0.51 0.07 0.01 
Eissue -0.01 0.11 0.94 
Lev** 0.10 0.05 0.04 
Dissue 0.18 0.05 0.42 
Turn -0.01 0.02 0.77 
Size -0.01 0.01 0.93 
CF** -0.84 0.16 0.03 
Constant*** 0.46 0.05 0.01 
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In all six regressions, the adoption of IFRS decreases the amount of positive 
earnings growth. The probit and OLS regression for the requirement of earnings growth 
being less than 1.5% of assets both resulted in negative coefficients for PostIFRS, 
meaning that the increase in earnings growth was small, and therefore likely due to 
earnings management. The p-values for the 1.5% criteria were both 0.1, meaning the 
result is significant at the 10% level. The probit and OLS regression for the requirement 
of earnings growth being less than 1% of assets also both resulted in negative coefficients 
for PostIFRS. For these regressions, PostIFRS is significant at the 5% level. Finally, the 
probit and OLS regression for the requirement of earnings growth being less than 0.5% of 
assets resulted in negative coefficients for PostIFRS at a level of 5% significance. These 
results are evidence of a significant increase in earnings management for firms that 
mandatorily adopted IFRS. It is concluded that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
financial reporting quality and transparency for investors declines. The results did not 
support my hypothesis.  
The more often that current year incomes are barely beating last year’s earnings, 
the more likely that companies are managing their earnings. The smaller the earnings 
growth and the more earnings management that is occurring, then the less transparent the 
financial statements are and the worse off investors are. Although this result opposes 
Ahmed, Neel, and Wang’s (Ahmed et al. 2012b) finding that earnings management is not 
affected by IFRS, it confirms their overall conclusion that IFRS decreases financial 
reporting quality. Beyond Ahmed, Neel, and Wang’s study, this conclusion finds 
opposing results with most other studies that look at IFRS effect on financial reporting 
quality.   
24 
For investors, these results are very important because if there is a lack of 
transparency, there is a lack of certainty. Without transparent financials, investors cannot 
be sure about the risk involved when investing in the company. For example, if, through 
earnings management, a company is hiding their true debt, then investors may not be 
aware of the company’s true level of bankruptcy risk. This may therefore mislead an 
investor to invest in the company when they might not have if there was 100% 
transparency surrounding the firm’s financial position.   
V. Conclusion 
IFRS is not accomplishing its mission to develop standards that “bring 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency to financial markets around the world.” This 
study examines the effect that the mandatory adoption of IFRS has on accounting quality 
using earnings growth as a percentage of total assets as a proxy. It looks at a sample of 
258 firms from 20 countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005 and compares those 
firms to 258 benchmark firms that did not adopt IFRS. The empirical regressions find a 
significant decline in financial reporting quality for firms that adopted IFRS in 2005. 
IFRS decreases transparency for investors and therefore negatively affects the investing 
public. This lack of transparency could alter investment decisions and mislead investors. 
This study adds to Ahmed’s study (2012b) by researching the third commonly 
accepted threshold for earnings management, sustaining previous year’s income, which 
Ahmed did not research. I conclude that sustaining previous year’s income, unlike 
positive earnings and analyst consensus earnings forecast, confirms Ahmed’s conclusion 
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that there is a decline in financial reporting quality when countries mandatorily adopted 
IFRS.  
One limitation to this study is that it is assumed that the change in earnings 
growth is due to managements’ judgments rather than a natural result of a change in 
properties of the accounting standard. Another limitation is that the data only looks at a 2-
year post adoption period. In further research, researchers can extend this study to look at 
the long-term effect of IFRS on earnings management and its implications on investors.  
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